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I. INTRODUCTION
Product innovations contribute to economic progress by expanding the range of choices
available to consumers and by improving the performance dimensions of existing products. However,
the incentives to innovate do not stem directly from the social value of new or improved products
but from the private returns that innovators manage to capture in the marketplace. In order to be
an effmtive inducement, these potential rents must be secured from the competitive threats posed by
pre-existing products, from imitators, and, at least for some time, from products extending the
technological frontier even further. As Arrow (1962) pointed out, innovators have to enjoy some
degree of transitory market power in order to pay for their innovations. In this paper, we examine
some of the critical measurement issues that arise in this context, by evaluating the sources of
transitory market power in the market for microcomputers (commonly referred to as personal
computers, or just PCS) in the late 1980s.
In differentiated, fast changing product markets, innovative firms might be able to take
advantage of several different sources of transitory market power. First, new products might
incorporate novel features, making existing products only an imperfect substitute for the new good.
Second, firms may try to slow down the pace of rent-dissipation in the marketplace by extending the
protective umbrella of a pre-existing brand-name reputation over new product introductions. To take
advantage of this branding, innovators might exploit a widespread willingness to pay a brand
premium; alternatively, the innovator might concentrate on serving high-margin niche markets for the
latest offerings from “high-quality” branded producers (Teece, 1988).
Of course, the classical justification for patents, trademarks, and other forms of formal
intellectual property protection is precisely their ability to provide temporary monopoly power in
order to prompt innovation and creativity; yet, these forms of protection seem to have played only
a minor role in ensuring innovative rents in the PC industry during the late 1980s. ] Consequently, we
1 Patents did not substantially delay the entry of imitators as the indust~ is organized around
an open technical standard. Thus, our industry is like the majority of those studied by Levin et al.
(1987) in the modest role played by patents in ensuring appropriability.focus here on the role that pushing the technological frontier (in this case meaning the incorporation
of the 80386 microprocessor) and relying on a brand name reputation (such as that of IBM) played
in ensuring transitory market power to innovative PC firms.
Our starting point is the fact that markets for differentiated products often exhibit some form
of segmentation or clustering according to a small number of “principles of differentiation” (PDs).
Each PD defines a distinct notion of product similarity according to the presence or absence of some
key product characteristic and offers a potential source of market segmentation. Thus, products that
belong to the same cluster (defined by these PDs) would be closer substitutes to each other than to
products belonging to other clusters. We consider here two such principles: whether or not the
product is associated with a strong brand name (Branded, B, versus Non-Branded, NB) and whether
or not the product is at the cutting edge of the technological frontier (Frontier, F, versus
Non-Frontier, NF). Both contemporary industry sources as well as retrospective analysis support the
view that the late 1980s market for personal computers indeed exhibited the 4-way clustering implied
by these two PDs: {B, F}, {B, NF), {NB, F}, and {NB, NF}.2 The model of demand that we
estimate, the instruments that we use for that purpose, and the issues that we address with the
estimates all stem from and build upon these two principles of differentiation.
We devote the bulk of the paper to the estimation of a discrete choice model of demand for
PCS that allows us to evaluate the substitution patterns within and across these PDs. To do so, we
draw from and extend recent methodological advances in the empirical study of product differentiated
markets (Bresnahan 1981, 1987; Trajtenberg, 1990; Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes,
1995). Following Berry (1994), we motivate the functional form for the demand system by modeling
a discrete choice maximization problem faced by a set of heterogeneous consumers. We then account
for the potential correlation between price and unobserved quality by utilizing a set of instruments
breed on the attributes of competing products using a model of competition. The specific model that
we put forward, the “Principles of Differentiation (PD) Generalized Extreme Value (GEV),” is a
particular application of the GEV class of models suggested by McFadden (1978). The PD GEV
allows us to treat different potential sources of segmentation symmetrically, thus overcoming the
2 As a matter of semantics, we shall refer to each of these groupings as clu,sters (notice that
PCS belonging to the {NB, NF ) cluster are commonly referred to as “clones”).
2hierarchical structure (and concomitant limitations) of the familiar Multi-Level Nested Logit model.
Finally, we take advantage of our priors about the prevailing principles of differentiation and use
instrumental variables that reflect “local” (i.e., within-PD) competitive conditions, thus exploiting an
additional source of variation in the context of our short panel dataset.
Our main findings are, first, that the PC market was indeed highly segmented during the late
1980s, along both the F and the B dimensions. Consequently, the effects of competitive events (such
as entry, imitation, or price cuts) in any one cluster were confined mostly to that particular cluster,
with little repercussion on the others. For example, our simulations imply that less than 5% of the
market share achieved by a hypothetical clone entrant would be market-stealing from other clusters.
The second finding is that the product differentiation advantages of B and F were qualitatively quite
different, The advantage associated with positioning a product at the technological frontier was
limited to the relative isolation that it provided from the large number of NF competitors. By
contrast, bestowing a brand name reputation on a new product not only provided some protection
from competition from non-branded PCS, but also s~ed out the product demand curve a great deal.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 11we discuss some key features of the PC
market in the late 1980s, including sources of buyer heterogeneity and the appropriateness of the
clustering scheme proposed. We then describe the data, consisting of market shares, prices and
attributes for each PC product sold in 1987 and 1988. In Sections IV and V, we develop the
Principle of Differentiation GEV model, review its implementation, and present and discuss the set
of instruments used in the estimation. We present the main results in Section VI, assess their
robustness, and perform some simulations that highlight the extent of segmentation. Section VII
concludes.
3II. THE PC MARKET IN THE LATE 1980s3
Technical change in personal computing has been extremely fast and sustained; moreover, the
nature of competition among PC fm has changed over time as well. Our snapshot of the market in
1987-88 catches the technology in swift transition with the introduction of a new microprocessor, the
80386, which we associate here with the Frontier, The role played by brand-name reputation is also
highlighted, a role that would evolve and mutate later on, as the identities and types of firms with
substantial brand capital changed. At the time when the 80386 was introduced (in late 1986), the
design and production of microcomputers making effective use of the new chip posed considerable
technical difficulties, and required substantial R&D efforts from PC makers.4 By the end of 1986,
only the most technically capable PC firms had succeeded in introducing an 80386-based system. A
handful of other PC makers would see their development efforts succeed during our sample period,
whereas most other firms took even longer to come out with marketable 386 designs.
A key question posed in this paper is the extent to which PCS that belonged to the Frontier
(or were marketed by a Brand) were insulated from competition by Non-Frontier (Non-Branded)
products. The answer to this question crucially depends on the degree of )leterogeneity among
buyers in their valuation of Frontier andor Branded status. In the presence of substantial
heterogeneity, Frontier (and Brand) can be protected from the competition of Non-Frontier (and
Non-Brand), while at the same time coexisting with these products, neither group eliminating the
other.
3 We limit our analysis ~M PCS and IBM-compatible PCS. Following industry convention
at the time, we exclude both older, 8-bit computers (Apple II, CPM, etc.) and incompatible
architectures such as Apple Macintosh. While Macintosh and IBM-compatible machines would
converge in capabilities over time (particularly during the early 1990s), there was little important
overlap among commercial customers during the period under study.
4 By the mid- 1990s, it has become much easier to incorporate frontier technology into PC
design. This is because a much higher share of PC innovation has become embedded in the
components themselves (such as an Intel microprocessor) rather than in the integration among
components (see Henderson and Clark (1990) for a discussion between component-based versus
integration-based innovation). In the era under study in this paper, the opposite was true. PC
equipment manufacturers had to develop specialized skills and make substantial expenditures in
order to market a product on the technological frontier (Steffens, 1994).
4,.
A close-up look at the transition from 286- to 386-based PCS suggests that there were
indeed pronounced differences across buyers in their assessment of the prospective benefits of 386-
ba.sedPCS, From an engineering perspective, the new systems yielded substantial improvements in
the ability to run software due to the increased speed of the microprocessor and an improved address
model for the main memory. However, some users (and analysts) saw 386-based systems just as
faster versions of older PCS. Others, already running or planning to run more advanced and
demanding software (such as the new Microsof~M operating environment, Windows), saw them
as the only sufficient platform that would satisfy their computing needs within the useful life of the
current purchase. These conflicting opinions, echoed in lively debates in the trade press, presumably
led to sigtilcant differences among buyers in their willingness to pay for the much more capable but
also much more expensive 386-based PCS.5 We would expect such heterogeneity to result in a
steeply sloped demand curve for the Frontier PCS, as well as in poor substitutability between Frontier
and Non-Frontier systems. Our model will measure these features of demand, and hence the extent
to which Frontier PCS were insulated from Non-Frontier competition at that time.
PCS differed not only in terms of their technical features, but also in terms of the brand-name
reputation that the manufacturers bestowed on them, During our sample period, PC buyers valued
Brandedness as an indicator of high quality service and support from selling firms, as well as an
indication that the product was reliable and practical for business applications. IBM, the leading brand
name in the PC market for many years, was not just the inventor of the dominant design in PCS but
ako enjoyed a reputation for service, support, and technical excellence from making and marketing
larger computers to business customers. Other large electronics fm also had preexisting reputations;
of these, we treat AT&T and Hewlett Packard as branded based on, (~ their market and
technological leadership in indust~ segments close to PCS; and (ii) their stated commitment to the
business-oriented PC market segment, backed up by substantial advertising and marketing
5 O’Malley (1989) summarized both sides of the debate: “While a 386 or 386SX system often
is a wiser purchase than a 286, those suggesting the demise of the 286 misunderstand the scope
and diversity of PC applications.”
5expenditures.b The fourth fm we treat as branded, and the only specialized PC firm so treated, is
Compaq. The largest advertiser in the PC market at the time, Compaq built its brand name by
establishing a reputation for innovation in PCS (such as its introduction of the first 386-based PC
prior to IBM) and by providing reliable service and support for these frontier products (Steffen,
1994). Within a few years after our sample, several other firms built substantial brand reputations
by imitating Compaq’s strategy; however, except for Compaq, none had been successful prior to
1988.7
As with Frontier status, the issue of the degree of insulation from competition that branded
firms enjoyed vis a vis non-branded ones, hinges largely on the extent to which buyers
heterogeneously value the attributes signaled by brandedness. A branded company’s reputation for
service, support, and product reliabtity presumably is valued by all buyers (and we will measure that).
Some buyers, however, may have particularly high valuations for these firm-related attributes, and
presumably will be wiUingto pay an even higher premium for Branded products. In fact, this sort of
heterogeneity was widely reported for PC purchases in our sample period.a Buyers in large
organizations (e.g. those in the Fortune 500) tended to favor branded PCS over those offered by
clone makers. Other, usually smaller, organizations valued brandedness significantly less tending to
buy the cheaper clone computers. In our primary specification, we treat IBM, AT&T, HP and
Compaq as a separate branded group, and seek to measure how insulated their PCS were from
competition from clones.9
b Other large computer companies sold PCS, but primarily to their existing customers rather
than in a mass market. We treat these, including Burroughs, Honeywell and Wang, as Non-
Branded.
7 Dell Computer would be the next entrant into the Branded segment through the
development of a reputation for excellent service and support in conjunction with substantial
advertising.
s See Ryan (1987), Jenkins (1987), and Kolodziej (1988).
9 In related specifications, we also examine whether ~M was further separated from other
branded firms. We also experiment with the boundary of the branded segment. Other marketing
variables, such as distribution channels (store/mail order) may have been important but do not
receive special treatment in our models.
6In principle, not just Frontier and Brand but other aspects of PCS, technical and otherwise,
could have been the source of market segmentation and hence of temporary monopoly power.
However, IBM’s historic deeision to have an open architecture for PCS (and the decision of the other
PC fm at the time of our sample to be strictly compatible), allows us to eliminate outright a whole
class of potential sources of market segmentation. IBM’s open architecture meant that buyers could
“mix and match” a wide range of peripherals and add-in cards; therefore, price differentials between
PCS due to such components could be arbitraged away. 10Given the existence of a competitive retail
market for unbundled components, variations in attributes such as the amount of RAM, or the size
of the hard disk, could not make one PC a poor substitute for another. We therefore treat these
characteristics as hedonic attributes, in the sense that we allow them to shift the relative level of
demand for each PC but not to affect the substitution patterns between products.1 1
Having focused here on the sources of transito~ market power, it is important to put our
sample period in perspective, sketch the forces that brought rapid change to the PC industry, and
transformed time and again the patterns of competition in it. Both the supply of technically advanced
PCS and the demand for desktop computing are being shifted continuously by powerful dynamic
processes. The PC sector itself is technically progressive, Immediately upstream lie other fast-paced,
innovative industries such as integrated circuits, mass storage devices, and so on. The introduction
of ever faster microprocessors, memory chips, and disk drives frequently shifts out the
in~ention-possibilities curve in PCS themselves. There are also a variety of technically progressive
industries downstream. Software products like operating systems, word processors, and spreadsheets
advance rapidly, pushing out the demand for more technical y advanced PCS.
10Some PCS are limited in the amount of RAM they can maximally hold. Up to this limit,
however, buyers can typically populate the computer with more of less RAM according to their
budget and the software they seek to run. Sellers typically picked these limits so that they did not
bind on customers early in the life of the machine.
11An intermediate case is microprocessor speed, expressed in MHZ. Buyers could not
arbitrage it, since speed is “designed into” the microprocessor and controller card. The
availability of several different processor speeds with most models somewhat mitigated this effect
since, in most cases, buyers could find their ideal point nearly met by an offered variation. We
examine this issue in a variant of our base specification.
7These relentless changes mean that both sources of segmentation that we seek to measure,
Frontier and Brand, were shifting rapidly. Shortly after our period, a much larger number of
companies sold 386-based PCS. Later still, newer and faster microprocessors heralded a new frontier.
In the same era, a number of firms improved marketing operations, especially delivery and customer
support, thereby approaching Branded status. In the early 1990s, the principal suppliers of
microprocessors and operating systems, Intel and Microsoft respectively, came to hold much of the
control of PC standards that IBM was losing in our sample period. 12The current PC industry
structure, with multiple technically capable branded firms competing, emerged from these events.
There is little doubt that these changes destroyed much of the transitory market power that we seek
to measure in a moment of transition. However, the private incentives to innovate arise from the
discounted (expected) value of the rents which accrue in each period; in this sense, the period-specific
measurement of transitory market power is a key step towards understanding innovative investment
in dynamic technology-intensive markets.
III. THE DATA
Estimating a product-level differentiated demand system requires data on quantities sold,
prices, and characteristics of each make/model in each year. Estimates of total market size are
also needed. The dataset that we gathered for the present study consists of all PC make/ models
(boxes) for which accurate data on price and attributes could be obtained for 1987 and 1988.
Identifying a comprehensive, well-defined set of distinct make/models constituted a major stumbling
block. Because of the difficulties encountered in gathering accurate data for each and every box, we
restricted the scope of the dataset to those vendors with a relevant market presence (see Table 1).
The resulting sample consists of 121 make/models (observations) for 1987, and 137 for 1988.13
12During and after our sample period, ~M attempted to regain control of PC market
standard setting via the 0S/2 operating system and the introduction of a novel (and proprietary)
PC design (Micro-Channel Architecture). Ultimately, IBM’s strategy to regain standard setting
leadership failed.
13 See Appendix A for a detailed description of the data gathering methodology. Appendix B
provides precise definitions of all variables used in the analysis.
8Quantities were obtained from a databme provided by COMTEC Market Analysis Services,
covering the years 1987 and 1988. COMTEC reports in great detail purchases of information
technology (lT) equipment (including PCS) by a large, weighted sample of business establishments
in the U.S.’4 Using COMTEC’S weighting scheme, one can extrapolate from the sample data to
calculate the total number of PCS sold for each make/model, Since COMTEC samples business
establishments in the U.S. whether or not they purchased PCS, one can use the same weighting
scheme to estimate the total potential market size for desktop business PCS. For our purposes we
t~e the potential market to be the total number of office-based employees (39 million.) The model
that we estimate includes an “outside good” (that is, the option of not buying), and therefore
market shares are computed as unit sales of each make/model divided by 39 million,
Our price and characteristics data come from the GML MicroComputer Guide, as well as
from a wide variety of additional sources. We focused on a small number of critical technical
characteristics including the microprocessor, the standard RAM provided (expressed in KB), the
speed (MHZ), and the standard hard disk provided (DISK, in MB). 15
As mentioned above, our analysis relies heavily on the possible existence of two
principles of differentiation in the PC market at the time: whether or not the PC was at the
technological frontier and whether or not it was produced by a branded firm. We capture the former
with a dummy variable (FRONTIER) that assigns the value of 1 to PCS incorporating the 80386
microprocessor, and O to those with all other microprocessors (the 286, 8088, and older). As
mentioned in Section II, we identified four vendors for which a brand name was a potentially
import ant determinant of demand and substitution patterns: IBM, AT&T, Hewlett-Packard and
Compaq. 16 The variable BRANDED assigns 1 to products produced by these four firms and O to
14The COMTEC “Wave 6“ dataset that we use here is based on a sample of over 6,000
establishments. Note that the sample excludes households.
15These are the characteristics actually used in the estimation. We also collected
information on the monitor type (B&W or Color), whether the machine was portable, model
vintage, etc.
16Other configurations were attempted; the qualitative results are not affected by the
inclusion or exclusion of branded firms at the margin.
9products produced by other vendors,
Tables 2-4 provide a useful portrait of the PC industry in each of the years under study.
Though the two samples are only a year apart, there are substantial differences in the average
price/performance of PCS sold. Whereas the average price changed only slightly between the two
years ($3,225 to $3,205), the average hard disk size (DISK), speed (MHZ), and memory (RAM)
all increased substantially. For example, the average standard RAM increased from 611 KB to
688 KB. Indeed, the average level of each of these characteristics rose over 10% between the
two years. The rate of technical advance is accentuated if the observations are weighted by the
quantities sold. For example, the weighted average standard RAM rises from 584 KB to716 KB.
The rate of advance shows also in the share of 386-based PCS (i.e., the average for FRONTER),
which grew from 10% of the sample in 1987 to 1570 in 1988. By contrast, the number of
BRANDED products stayed nearly constant, averaging 30% of the number of make/models
marketed in both years. The advance in the price/performance ratio is highlighted in a regression of
price on the observed product characteristics (Table 3). The coefficients for each of the technical
characteristics are estimated to be positive, while the 1988 coefficient is substantially lower than for
1987. While a substantial amo~nt of price variation exists in each year, our sample reflects the rapidly
falling real prices for computing power which has characterized this market segment since its
inception (Bemdt and Griliches, 1993).
Finally, we “slice” the data according to our PDs (Branded and Frontier) in Table 4. Perhaps
the most striking statistic from this table is that while a relatively high share of all products are
concentrated in the NB~F cluster, at least 6090 of the boxes sold in each year are drawn from the
B/NF cluster. Moreover, the average price for boxes rises as one moves from the “clone” NB/NF
cluster through NBF (or B/NF), with the highest average prices in the BE cluster. While this
preliminary cut of the data suggests the presence of substantial returns to membership in either the
F or B group, one cannot identify the precise way in which these returns manifested themselves
(through the benefit of a large demand curve, or, alternatively, a steep one) from this simple table.
Instead, our more systematic evaluation of the returns to membership in the B or F group will follow
the estimation of the differentiated product demand system, the model to which we now turn.
10IV. MODELING THE DEMAND FOR PCS
The rest of this paper is devoted to estimating a model of PC demand which allows us to
evaluate precisely the origins of transitory market power and isolation from competition in the PC
market during 1987-88. We measure the demand for PCS at the product level and explore the
different competitive positions of PCS which incorporated different attributes. 17Our model, based
on the familiar random utility model, aggregates from individual buyer heterogeneity to product level
demand. Besides corresponding to PC market reality, this permits straightforward treatment of new
products and of products no longer being sold. Our model is novel in that it permits the existence of
non-overlapping principles of differentiation (like brandedness and frontiers status) without calling
for difficult numerical integration.
A. THE RANDOM UTILITY APPROACH TO DEMAND ESTIMATION
Our model of PC demand is motivated by the theory of random utility (Quando, 1956), as
developed in the “Generalized Extreme Value” (GEV) class of models put forward by McFadden
(1978) and following Berry’s recent proposal for the estimation of such models (Berry, 1994). Our
point of departure is a discrete choice random utility model. Each buyer is assumed to maximize by




Vij = Xj’p + apj + gj + Tlij (1)
where Vi is the value of product j to buyer 1. For product j, Xj is a vector of observed product
characteristics, pj is the price and ~jis the level of unobsemed product quality.
‘7 We exploit and extend recent methodological advances which have expanded the range of
economic models which can be estimated with product-level data (Bresnahan, 1981, 1987;
Trajtenberg, 1990; Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995).
11,.
Our treatment follows Berry (1994), decomposing Vi into t-.voparts. Let
aj = X;p + ap. + g.
J J (2)
be the mean valuation by buyers for product j. Thus, qi is the difference between buyer I’s value for
product j from the average valuation in the population (~j). Each buyer receives a draw of the J,+l
vector, q,, which is a realization of the random variable q. The draws are independent across buyers
but a given buyers’ draw of qti need not be independent of qk if products j and k share
similar product characteristics. The distribution of q depends on parameters p and the product
characteristics X. We write this (J+1 dimensional) CDF as F(q; X, p). Thus, {~, a, p } is the vector
of parameters to be estimated in this discrete choice demand system.
Since the work of Quandt (1956), we have known that the distribution of the random shocks
to valuation, here q, is a key determinant of the shape of demand. In the context of our discrete
choice model, there is in fact a precise relationship between the distribution of q at the individual
buyer level and the pattern of cross-product elasticities at the aggregate market level. The modeler
picks a family of distributions F(q; X, p). Particular values of the parameter vector p correspond
to patterns of dependence in q across products sharing common (or similar) product characteristics.
Our model contains a parameter p~, for example, which permits dependence across the idiosyncratic
shocks to Frontier products. For certain values of p~, a buyer strongly prefening any Frontier
product (qij >> O) is also likely to strongly prefer all Frontier products (E [qk Iqti >> O]>>0]
if k and j share Frontier status.)
Now consider the impact of an increase in the price of particular product j: the value of
product j falls (at a rate a) and some portion of those consumers whom had initially chosen j are
induced to switch to what had been previously their second-best alternatives. Because of the
dependence in the distribution of q, a relatively high share of these second-best alternatives will be
other Frontier products. More generally, positive dependence in the distribution of q among similar
products makes those products closer substitutes.]a The parameters p measure that dependence.
‘8 This type of dependence across observations can be contrasted with the case where q is iid
across choices (as in the multinominal logit). Under the assumption of independence, the
12As dependence in q across products with similar products characteristics b.comes stronger,
competition will become more “segmented,” in the sense that the impact of competitive events (such
as a price decrease or entry) will be confined mostly to those products with similar characteristics.
In other words, in this framework a model of which classes of products are close substitutes & a
model of dependence among the elements of q related to product characteristics.
B. A PRINCIPLES OF DIFFERENTIATION GEV MODEL OF PC DEMAND
Of course, a separate question exists m to how to ident~ those product characteristics which
may be important for understanding differentiation and market segmentation. Fortunately, economic
theory, in conjunction with an understanding of the particular market under study, provides
considerable guidance. Like many other consumer products, there exists several features of the PC
(such as the amount of RAM or the size of the hard drive) for which there exists a separate market
for that feature (or component). In the presence of competitive component markets, buyers will
arbitrage away price premiums msociated with the incorporation of these components into particular
products. In other words, to the extent that consumers can “repackage” products along a specific
dimension, each consumer will equate their m~ginal utility for this dimension to its price in the post-
sales market. Accordingly, there wiUk no ex-post heterogeneity among consumers in their marginal
valuations for this dimension. Thus, in choosing how to parametrize the distribution function F(q;
X, p), one should incorporate potential correlation among products which share characteristics which
are not “repackageable,”
Guided by this rule, we focus on two product characteristics which we argue are not
repackageable -- Branded and Frontier. The existence of a Brand name reputation, by construction,
cannot be marketed in the post-sales market. As well, during the period under study, considerable
technical expertise was required to incorporate the 80386 microprocessor into a PC. In contrast,
buyers could entertain several post-sales options to recotilgure their memory options (e.g., RAM and
DISK) and, to a lesser extent, the speed of their microprocessor (MHZ).
introduction of a new product will have the same (proportional) effect on all products in the
market, regardless of characteristics. This implication of the iid assumption is just a restatement
of the “Red Bus/Blue Bus” problem emphasized by McFadden (1973).
13To accommodate the presence of non-mutually exclusive product groupings (i.e., PDs) in a
computationally straightforward specification, we need to parametrize F(q; p) so that several PDs
can be incorporated symmetrically into the distribution function. To do so, we rely upon Theorem
1 of McFadden (1978), which states a significant generalization of the nested
(NML) model. McFadden introduces the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV)
constructive proof demonstrating that a wide variety of dependencies (and




Proposition 1 (Adaptedfrom Theorem 1, McFadden (1978)): If G:
RJ+l _ R 1 is a non-negative, homogeneous of degree one function
satisfying certain restrictions,19 then
F(qio,... ,qiJ) =exp-G(e -nio, ....ni-)i’) (3)






is the corresponding equation determining the market share of product
j, where G, is the partial derivative of j with respect to e8J.
McFadden (1978) suggests that Proposition 1 can serve as a straightforward and general
purpose specification tool: by specifying the function G(s), the modeler chooses the pattern of
dependency of qfis across products. Thus, Proposition 1 provides a method for parameterizing the
cross-product substitution matrix. Our model will utilize this theorem to parametrize a random
utility model which incorporates non-nested cross-product correlations in q .20
19The limit of G (.) as any argument goes to OJmust be equal to +~. Mixed partials of G(.)
must alternate in sign and first partials must be non-negative (McFadden, 1978).
20 Most previous research has implemented some version of the NML (a special case of the
structure in Theorem 1). We are aware of only one other empirical study (Small, 1987) which
14In order to make the logic of the theorem more understandable, consider the G(.) function
msociated with a traditional specification, the one-level NML. To incorporate potential correlation
among products according to whether or not the product is at the technological frontier (F versus
NF), the function G(”) takes the form,
[F )p’+[j~e’’’)p)+e +(’(’
G(e*) = ~e*J’pF (5)
where the parameter p~parameterizes the degree of substitutability among products with the same
Frontier status (F or NF) relative to the substitution among non-matching products .21 To be
consistent with (1), the distributional parameter p~ must lie in the unit interval. As p~ goes to O,the
dependence across products which share For NF status becomes stronger. Conversely, as p~ goes
to 1, (5) simplifies to the G function associated with a simple multinornial logit model (i.e., each
element of q is independent) .22
In our application, we are interested in parameterizing the potential correlation among
products along (at least) two distinct dimensions (F/NF and B/NB). To accommodate this in the
most straightforward way, we compose G(.) to be the weighted sum of two one-level NML G(o)
functions, as follows:
G(e *) = a~
[[2:1” + [Le+l%
+ aB
utilizes McFadden (1978) to parametrize a non-nested structure.
21 The other parameters to be estimated (~ and a) are included in 5.
(6)
22 The precise statistical interpretation of p, particularly in the case of a multi-level nested
logit, is subtle. See Cardell (1992) for a fuller discussion of the distributional assumptions and the
variance components structure of the NML model.
15where a~+ a~= 1, and p~ and p~ are between 0 and 1.23 Because we introduce terms composed of
products which share PDs, we denote this model the PD GEV. The only difference between (6) and
more traditional nested logit models of product differentiation (e.g., (5)) is that each product
contributes to a term which memures its substitution with products which share technological status
(For NF) and in a term which measures its substitution with products which share marketing status
(B or NB). Note that if pp= 1 the model is a nested logit by Branded status only, and if p, = 1 the
model is nested by Frontier status only.
The implications of(6) for substitution in the market can be seen more clearly in terms of the





Notice that this share equation is composed of two terms, one for F and one for B, the numerator of
which is proportional to the one-level NML. Consider a product located in {B~), Ffi) }; then,
changes in the prices or attributes of products located also in the same cluster {B~), F(j) } will have
a relatively strong impact on the market share of product j, whereas changes in products which are
neither in B(j) nor in F~) will have a lesser impact. Clearly, the impact of changes in products that
share just one PD with product j will be somewhere in between. Each of these effects is stronger as
the relevant p goes to zero.
23 The scaling parameters are defined as follows,
1-pF 1-p’
aF =
2-pF-pB ‘ aB =
2-PF-PB
Since the weights (a~ and a~) are positive, all of the homogeneity, derivative, and limiting
properties needed for Proposition 1 are true. As either p goes to 1, the associated weight goes to
zero. This takes (6) smoothly to (5); At ppD= 1, PD is not important for segmentation.
16While our proposed model, (6), is quite simple, Proposition 1 can accommodate a wide range
of different clustering structures, including a larger number of “principles of differentiation, ”
interactions between them, etc. Incorporating additional dimensions of potential product
differentiation simply requires adding suitable terms to (6).24 In this sense, the McFadden Theorem
provides a useful and underutilized modeling tool with potentially wide applicability.
c. THE PD GEV VERSUS ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF SUBSTITUTION
Given our goal to measure the degree of segmentation afforded by (at least) two distinct PD’s
(B/NB and F/NF), several issues arise which make the most traditional (and computationally
straightforward) parameterizations of the joint distribution of q inappropriate for our problem. First,
because we want to distinguish between several different sources of product differentiation, we
cannot employ a simple unidimensional vertical product differentiation (VPD) specification
(Bresnahan, 1981, 1987; Berry, Camall and Spiller, 1996; Stavins, 1996), in which a single
distributional parameter measures variation among consumers in their preferences for overall product
quality. As well, a nested multinominallogit (NML) model (Trajtenberg, 1990; Goldberg, 1995; Stem,
1996), in which several mutually exclusive dimensions of product differentiation can be incorporated,
is also inappropriate. For example, if we were to specify (1) to be a two-level nested logit with the
top level of the nesting determined by the B/NB distinction (Figure 1), we would be assuming away
potential correlation in q (and the resulting implications for market-level substitution) among
products which share Frontier status but do not match along the B/NB dimension. Thus, neither the
VPD and W models can parametrize our principal hypotheses directly -- the separate existence
of segmentation along two overlapping dimensions (F/NF and B/NB).
In order to assess the relative merits of the PD GEV, it is worth comparing it in more detail
to the two-level M (see Figure 1). It is important to note that our proposed model (6) is no more
richly parameterized than a two-level NML. Instead, the difference between the two models is that
the PD GEV accommodates substitution in a way that we argue is more appropriate for our
24 We have estimated several variant models (only a subset of which are presented in the
Results Section). We have experimented with additional clustering by MHZ (as in Small ,1987),
an “IBM” cluster, as well as others.
17application. In particular, while in both models products sharing both B and F status are closer
substitutes to each other than to other prodL~cts,the models differ in their treatment of substitution
among the partially matching products (note that the groups in the PD GEV are not mutually
exclusive).
Consider the two-level NML (with B on top) in the upper panel of Figure 1: the parameter
p~ determines how much “closer” products sharing both B and F are than those sharing only B. In
this sense, the NML is parameterizing segmentation along more than one dimension. However,
lowering the price of a {B, F} product hm the same effect on market shares in the partially matching
(NB, F) category as in the completely unhatching {NB, NF] category.” In this sense, the NML
permits only one of the two partially matching clusters to be close substitutes. Moreover, reversing
the order of nesting just reverses the problem.2b
These properties can be stated also in terms of cross-elasticities, where ~X,Y is the average
cross-price elasticity of a product in cluster y with respect to a change in the price of a product in
cluster x 27According to the two-level nested NML with B~B on top (as in Figure 1),
Reversing the order of nesting renders,
E~fbf 2 E“bf~f 2 Ebnf~f = enbnf ~f
(8)
(9)
25 As we have written the model and drawn the picture, it also has the same impact on the
outside good. This is not fundamental as it is possible to add a further parameter, say pC,and a
third level nest that has all PC’s versus the outside good.
26 As well, a four cluster one-level NML (F/B, F~B, NF/B, NFNB) also excludes the
possibility of dependence among partially matching products.
27 For this exercise, assume all products have equal market shares and prices. The elasticities
vary with price and market share monotonically. This assumption just simplifies the exposition.
18H~ving to choose between (8) and (9) is an uncomfortable specification choice. Neither of the
equalities seems likely to hold in the present context, since this case, as many others, is not naturally
nested.
The PD GEV overcomes this limitation by permitting both definitions of “local” to work in
a parallel fashion (see the second panel in Figure 1), i.e.,
E bf, bf 2 (E nbf,bf’ ‘bnf,bf) 2 ‘n~nf,bf ! and ‘nbf,bf ~ ‘bnf, bf (lo)
The two principles of differentiation, B and F, are thus treated in a completely symmetric way, Of
course, this specflcation is still restrictive, as there are only two parameters permitting more closely
related products to be better substitutes. Thus, while the model is no more richly parameterized than
the nested logit, it is more appropriate for our specific application which is to identify the impact
arising from separate PDs.
v. IMPLEMENTING THE PD GEV MODEL
A. THE ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE
We outline here the procedure by which the parameters of the PD GEV model can be
consistently estimated from a product-level dataset such as the one described in Section III.
Essentially, we follow the suggestion of Berry (1994) and construct a GMM estimator from the set
of expectations of the level of unobserved product quality, ~, conditional on the exogenous
instruments (discussed below). In order to implement this procedure we need to isolate ~ and
express it as a function of data and parameters to be estimated. We are able to do so by “inverting”
the demand system. Recall from eq. (7) above that the market share of product j in a market with
J products can be written as,
(11)
19Notice that every element of 8, the (J+l) vector of average product quality, enters the market share
equation of each product. Thus, with a complete cross-section of products, the market share
equations form a system of J equations with (J+ 1) unknowns (the vector 5). We invert this system
for the implicit function 6(s, p). Setting 8., the mean value of the outside good, equal to O, we solve
s= S(a(s, p), p) (12)
We use this functional relationship to estimate the parameter vector {~, h, ?). We now
use our assumption that ~j is also the average level of utility associated with product j,
bj = Xj’p + ap. + g.
J J (13)
Rearranging (13) in terms of ~, and substituting in 5(s, p), we can define the sa~nple ~’ersiotzof the
disturbance for our estimator as,
(14)
Since E(~)=O, and under the assumption that Z, the matrix of instruments, is exogenous, then the
standard GMM estimator is defined as,
‘in L = ~’(ZQ-lZ ‘)~
p,a,p
(15)
where Q is the standard weighting matrix. Thus, the estimation of the model requires only standard
techniques, and is computationally straightforward.28
2s As suggested above (and in BLP (1995)), a two-step procedure is appropriate. First, 5 is
solved for as a function of the observed market shares and a “guess” for p (Eq. (12)). This
procedure involves a well-behaved numerical nonlinear procedure. With 6(s, p) in hand, the
remaining (mean-value) parameters (a, ~) can be estimated with a linear instrumental variables
estimator. Because the market share function can be expressed in closed form (see (11)), there is
no need for integration of the market share function on each iteration of the estimation. This
comes at a substantial computation savings relative to the simulated method of moments estimator
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B. INSTRUMENTS
The GMM estimator in (15) requires an instrumental variables (IV) vector, Z, with rank at
least as large as the dimensionality of the parameter vector, {~, a, p}. Of course, the efficient IV
vector is composed of the derivatives of the disturbance (t) with respect to the parameters. In the
current application it is quite difficult to construct the optimal Z, so we propose a simpler strategy
for the construction of Z for PD GEV models.
Our strategy relies on the econometric erogeneity of the entire matrix of product
characteristics, X. In the spirit of the recent literature, we use a model of supply to point out
functions of X which make plausible instruments. 29A row of our proposed Z(X) consists of
Xj, the observed product characteristics of product j
counts and means of X for products sharing a cluster with product j
. counts and means of X for products sold by the firm offering product j
counts and means of X for products sharing both cluster and seller.
This section first visits the general econometrics issues briefly. We then explain how our IV strategy
follows from an assumption of equilibrium pricing behavior by sellers in an industry with PD GEV
demand.
We face two challenges in constructing Z. With market power on the supply side, it is
dfilcult to just~ an assumption that price is independent of t; c has the interpretation of unobserved
product quality, meaning that a higher c, should lead suppliers to set a higher p. As a result,
E(P~)>0,30 Similar arguments mean that the prices and share of other products are correlated with
~J,so that the first term as well as the last term in the RHS of (14) calls for IV. To make this more
implemented in BLP (1995), Additional information (including GAUSS estimation programs) are
available by public access ftp archive.
29Our approach is most like of BLP (1995), who impose some of the economic restrictions of
their model on Z(X). Unlike BLP, we offer no proof that our Z is the first under term in a series
approximation to the optimal IV.
30 This problem was emphasized by Trajtenberg (1989, 1990), who found that the demand for
CT scanners was estimated to be positively sloped in the context of an NML model with
exogenous prices. Further analysis revealed that omitted quality, correlated with price, was indeed
the culprit for the positive bias. Our solution follows Berry (1994).
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difficult, the econometric framework is inherently nonlinear.31 In the face of such nonlinearity (and
without additional assumptions), the efficient IV vector will contain elements which are themselves
functions of the parameters to be estimated, leading to substantial computational difficulties
(Chamberlain, 1987).
In response to the difficulties, we propose to utilize our assumption that X, the matrix of
observed product characteristics in year t, is exogenous. The immediate implication of this
assumption is that we are able to include Xjdirectly in Z. This immediately reduces the number of
excluded instruments needed to dim (a,p ). ‘2
In general, we are looking for easy-to-calculate variables which are likely to be correlated with
price and/or ( * ) but are independent of ~. A natural source of instruments for demand
coefficients is supply.33To highlight this source of instruments, suppose that firms behave according
to the solution of a non-cooperative Bertrand-Nash price-setting game. Consider the FOC for product
j of a multiproduct fm selling several products, which we represent by the set 0~) (for ownership).
(16)
Any exogenous variable which shifts the RHS is a candidate instrument.34 First, we specify
PD-specific indices to reflect the number and strength of close substitutes on a group-specific basis.
For example, as the number of products in a particular group increases, the demand curve associated
with each product in that group will shift in and become flatter in (16). Both effects should impact
-j, at aa(s,p) —= is a highly nonlinear function of p.
ap ap
32In our base model, which has two distributional parameters, each row of Z must have a
minimum of (K+3) elements (where K is the number of observed product characteristics).
33This approach was critical to the identification of the (simpler) demand models of Bresnahan
(1981, 1987), in which model simplicity allowed for the analytical solution of equilibrium prices
and market shares.
‘4As in many other industries, it is difficult to obtain observable product-specific cost shifters
for PCS; consequently, we do not attempt identification via that route. However, this strategy can
sometimes be used appropriately (Bresnahan and Baker, 1986; Hausman, 1994).
22the observed price and the product’s within-group market “hare. Thus, the number of products in
each group will be correlated with the impact of the segmentation parameters, a and p, on prices and
the implicit function 5(s,p). Essentially, we exploit our assumption that the group-specific entry
process is exogenous (in an econometric sense) to create a “local” index of the number of substitutes
for each product. As shown in Table 5, we implement this idea by calculating an instrument vector
for observation j which includes the number of products in F~) and B~), the groups to which product
j belongs, as well as sums over the characteristics of other products in FQ) and B(j).
We also calculate “Ownership” instruments (Iabelled so in Table 5) which exploit the
economics of multiproduct pricing as reflected in the RHS of (16). For example, as a particular firm
sells a larger share of the number of total products available, it will charge a higher price on each
product (as compared to the prices which would be observed under a more unconcentrated market
structure). Similarly, the sum of the characteristics of the products of the firm (other than j) will be
positively correlated with price, since that
two analytical arguments and use the
ownership and cluster.
By using PD-spec~lc instruments,
would mean higher q~in eq.( 16).s5 Finally, we blend these
characteristics and count of products which share both
we use somewhat different instruments than our immediate
predecessors in the literature (BLP (1995)). In particular, we are using our assumption about the
group structure of product differentiation to construct the excluded IVS. This strategy is successful
because some groups, like Frontier, saw much more entry than others. This entry, which we assume
to be exogenous, shifts prices and maket shares by changing competition. The different rates of entry
across groups means that our proposed instruments vary even in the short panel considered in the
present application. It is useful to note that our erogeneity assumption may not be as strong as it
seems at first blush. In particular, while we believe that entry into specific clusters is endogenously
determined by its economic returns, this does not mean that our instruments are correlated with the
error. We include dummies for both B and F in observable product quality; which means that ~ is
merely the deviation of the products’ quality from the cluster means.
Finally, the discussion so far has been predicated on the assumption that firms engage in
35 In this argument we closely follow BLP (1995).
23Bertrand competition. However, if firms play a different type of non-cooperative game (e.g.
Coumot), then the precise form of (16) would change, but our instruments would be unaffected, since
the logic of ownership-based and group-based instruments remains the same. Outright collusion
though would make a difference, since ownership-based instruments would be longer be relevant.
More generally, the point is that the instruments should reflect the underlying supply and demand
conditions that prevail in the market, that is, the type of price setting behavior of firms, and the nature
of the heterogeneity of consumers as manifested in the groups. For the case at hand, we assume that
firms used individualistic pricing strategies; the pace of technical change in PCS and the ensuing
intensity of competition seems to have prevented price collusion, However, we will explore the
importance of this assumption by removing the ownership-based and PD-based instruments from Z
in the course of evaluating the robustness of our results.
VI. RESULTS
We turn now to the presentation and analysis of results from the estimation of the PD GEV
for a variety of specifications. We also present estimates of alternative Two-Level NML and VPD
models and contrast them with the PD GEV. After exploring the robustness and limitations of the
model, we illustrate the meaning of the estimates by drawing hypothetical demand functions for
Branded and Frontier PCS and perform a set of counterfactuals involving hypothetical entry to
highlight the high degree of market segmentation that these estimates imply.
A. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
We frst preview our main findings (drawn from Model 1 in Table 6) in a concise fashion to
help frame the discussion of the results:
(I) 0< (p,, p,) <<1. Both of the substitution parameters areestimatedtobe small (significantly
smaller than 1), suggesting that there is indeed a high degree of market segmentation along both the
B and F dimensions: Non-Branded products are poor substitutes for Branded products and
Non-Frontier products are poor substitutes for Frontier products. The parameter p~ is estimated
quite precisely in most specifications, while the estimate of p~ is much less precise. Nevertheless,
the estimates for both distributional parameters are quite stable across specifications.
24(ii) The product differentiation advantages of B and F are different. The advantage of being at the
frontier is limited to the insulation it provides from NF competition (p~eel). Perhaps surprisingly,
incorporating Frontier technology dld not necessarily shift the product demand curve out (~~~OmI~~
is small, usually negative, and always imprecisely estimated). In contrast, having a brand name shifts
out the product demand curve (~~m > O) and provides B products with some protection from NB
competition (p~ < 1),
(iiz]As expected, the price coefficient, a, is sensitive to whether or not the model accounts for price
endogeneity, and to the type of instruments used. Models that ignore the correlation of price with
unobserved quality result in much smaller (in absolute value) estimates of a; models which do not
exploit the full set of proposed instruments severely reduce the precision of this estimate.
(iv) The choice of model specification turns out indeed to be important for analyzing the market under
study. In fact, the leading alternative to the PD GEV model, the Two-Level NML, yields estimates
that are highly sensitive to the order of nesting. In particular, the relative sizes and significance of the
substitution parameters are reversed in the Two-Level NML model with the B/NB nest on top, vis
a vis the one with the F/NF nest on top. Thus, the PD GEV model offers an attractive method~logical
alternative, at least in those cases where the nesting order is not well defined a priori.
B. MAIN SPECIFICATION, ROBUSTNESS AND IDENTIFICATION
We present in Table 6 our base specification (Model 1), two alternative specifications in
which we vary the elements of X (the set of product characteristics), and a fourth one where we add
an additional PD. The parameters estimated are the distributional coefficients p~ and p~, a price
coefficient, a , various ~s (a constant, and coefficients for FRONTIER, BRANDED, IBM, and for
a sub-set of DISK, RAM, and MHZ), as well as p~~z in Model 4.
As previewed above, the estimates of p~ and p~ are quite small in all these specifications.
In fact, even though p~ is estimated very imprecisely, one can easily reject the hypotheses that p~ =
1 and/or p~ = 1. The results for the price coefficient, a, are encouraging: it is estimated to be
negative and quite stable across specflcations; however, its level of significance varies quite a bit (fair
25in Models 1 and 2, nil in Models 3 and 4). In all four models, the BRANDED coefficient is large,
positive, and significant while the FRONTIER coefficient cannot be distinguished from zero (and is
in fact negative in three out of four specifications). The ~M coefficient is positive and gives (at the
point estimate in the b~e specflcation) a 50% incremental boost to IBM products above and beyond
other Branded products. Finally, our technological control variables (DISK, RAM, and MHZ) have
the expected sign, though only the DISK coefficient is significant (in Model 1).36
It should be noted that the coefficients that determine the level and slope associated with B
and F, which are of particular interest here, are relatively stable across the four specifications.
Moreover, the point estimates suggest that there was a qualitative difference in the product
differentiation advantage afforded along the F versus the B dimension. In fact, we are able to reject
the hypothesis:
HO: p~ = p~, PF= ~B
at the 90% level in our main spec~lcation (Wald test statistic = 5.22, X2(OW, z,= 4.61). While the high
standard errors of the F coefficients do not allow us to draw firm conclusions (e.g., we cannot reject
~ at the 95% level), a cautious interpretation of this result is that, relative to the advantages arising
from having a brand name, being at the Frontier proved to be beneficial more in the sense of insulating
from competition than in pushing out the demand curve. In Model 4 we include a MHZ substitution
parameter (p~Hz= .99).37 In contrast to the substantial segmentation found along both the B and F
dimensions, there seems to be little evidence that there existed segmentation along the MHZ
dimension (we cannot reject HO: p~~z = 1).
In Table 7, we compare the estimates from the PD GEV with those from two alternative
spec~lcations of the Two-Level NML model. The most troubling feature of Models 5 and 6 is the
high sensitivity of the estimates to the order of nesting. In particular, with B/NB on top, p~ << pF,
36 We tried also combinations of these attributes, but the extremely high collinearity between
them, as well as between them on the one hand and PRICE and FRONTIER on the other,
rendered highly imprecise estimates.
37 Recall that specifying this model is easy. All that is required is the addition of several terms
to (6), each of which is a summation over sets of products which share a similar MHZ rating.
26while the reverse occurs when F~F is on top. Recall that a small p at a given level of the tree
signifies poor substitutability of products across branches at that level, and hence a high degree of
market segmentation according to the PD that governs the split between branches. According to
Model 5, the crucial distinction resides in whether a PC is branded or not (p~ is both very small and
precisely estimated). However, Model 6 implies the opposite, that is, that having Frontier status
confers insulation from competition from NF products, whereas Branded status does not provide
additional protection. Obviously, there is no way of telling within this context which of the two
models, contradictory as they are, is the “right” one. In contrast to these awkward modeling choices,
the PD GEV confronts the issue of relative importance directly by treating the two principles of
differentiation symmetrically.
In Table 8 we vary the instrument set in order to examine the robustness of our findings to
alternative identflcation assumptions. Model 7 treats prices as exogenous, ignoring their presumed
dependence on unobserved quality. The result is that the price coefficient shrinks dramatically (in
absolute value), providing weak evidence that prices are indeed endogenous (though we cannot reject
the overident~ing restrictions). In Model 8, we eliminate the ownership-based instruments, that is,
those that stem from the optimizing behavior of multi product firms. Similarly, Model 9 removes
PD-based instruments, that is, those associated with the variance in competition across groups, Each
of these exercises dramatically reduces the measured precision of the important parameters of the
model. The implication is quite clear: to identify our model, we constructed instruments that relied
on a behavioral assumption about supply and a structural one about the market. As it turns out, both
of these assumptions are necessary in order for us to provide evidence for our main findings.
We ran several other GEV specifications, accounting for serial correlation (across products
which appeared in both years), arbitrary heteroskedasticity, and additional potential substitution
patterns (e.g., the inclusion of four separate substitution parameters, p~, p~~, p~, p~~).38While there
exists no spec~lcation in which we can reject the qualitative results described above, the inclusion of
additional parameters drastically reduces the precision of most estimates, implying that there is only
so much that these data can tell (at least through these models). In other words, the results implied
38 These sections are not reported in tables but are available from the authors. An ftp archive
directory has been set up for public access.
27by Model 1 cannot be made more precise by additional modeling. A look at Tables 2 and 4 anew
suggests why we cannot hope for finer distinctions: the basic and overwhelming fact that any model
would have to accommodate is that IBM accounted for 6090 of the market (about 1 million unit sales
per year), and the bulk of those sales were in the (B, NF) cluster. By contrast, the average NB/NF
(clone) product sold less than 5,000 units/year. Thus, finer distinctions between non-IBM PCS lose
out to the stark contrast between IBM and the rest of the pack.
C. A GLIMPSE AT DEMAND CURVES FOR BRANDED AND FRONTIER PRODUCTS
We noted above that the estimates of ~~w~~~~is positive, large, and highly significant, that
~m~ is also positive, and that ~momm is negative and insigtilcant. In order to gain further intuition
as to the meaning of these results, we take for a moment the point estimates at face value and
construct hypothetical demand functions for different types of PCS. Figure 2 displays two
hypothetical 1987 demand curves, one associated with a typical IBM, Non-Frontier PC, the other
with a typical Non-Branded, Frontier PC. One point on each demand curve is the actual average price
and quantities for these two typical products. The other marked point on the demand curve for the
B3M/NF PC corresponds to the price at which the mean buyer’s valuation of an B3M~F PC would
just equal that of a “clone” product, that is, the price at which 51~~,~~= ~~~,~~. Likewise, we
calculate the price that renders 8NB, F= bNB,NF.
The demand curves thus constructed make it clear that the main advantage of Frontier status,
at that very early stage in the diffusion of the 386, seems to have been a steep demand curve rather
than a large one (recall the argument in section 2 about the type of users that chose 386-based PCS
back then). The converse was true for IBM/Branded status. While we have not estimated equations
characterizing sellers’ behavior, these demand distinctions would explain why IBM chose to take the
bulk of its product differentiation advantage as higher quantities rather than as higher prices (recall
the rzegative coefficient on IBM in the hedonic pricing equation (Table 2)), whereas the pioneer
manufacturers of Frontier PCS took the reverse course. The two mechanisms of appropriability, the
large demand curve and the steep one, were both at work in the industry, but within different PDs.
28D. COUNTERFACTUALS
In order to shed further light on the meaning of our findings, we present in Table 9 four
counterfactual exercises. In each we introduce a hypothetical new product into a particular cluster
and, using the estimates from Model 1, compute the changes in sales of other products that such entry
would induce. The main goal is to compare the effects of entry on sales of competing brands within
the same cluster, vis a vis the impact on sales in other clusters. We can thus provide a sense of the
degree of insulation from competition enjoyed by products in different clusters,
substitution parameters p~ and p~.
In each case, we introduce a hypothetical product with a value of 6
as captured by the
(i.e. its expected
attractiveness) set equal to the mean value for that cluster.g9 Holding the 6s of all other products
fixed (which means in particular that we do not allow for any pricing responses to this entry), we
recompute the implied market shares for all products, including the outside good. We then calculate
the difference in sales for each product before and after the hypothetical introduction. Finally, we sum
over all products in each cluster to evaluate the competitive effect of entry across clusters. Consider
Table 9 (A), in which an average F/B product is introduced (with 5 = -5.2). The model predicts that
the sales of this hypothetical PC would total 8511 units, of which 5270 (61%) is “market-stealing”
from within the F/B cluster. Market-stealing across clusters is significantly smaller, drawing 1700
additional units (20%). The remainder comes from the outside good, that is, from individuals who
had not purchased PCS before. In the last part of the table, 9(E), we show a simple market-stealing
segmentation statistic and its (linearized) standard error. The numerator is the percentage change in
unit sales of existing products within the cluster as a result of the entry experiment. This negative
number becomes larger (in absolute value) as the entrant becomes more important and as
segmentation becomes more important. The denominator is the percentage change in unit sales of
all PC products. This positive number increases with the importance of the product introduced.
These statistics confirm the importance of intracluster market stealing implied by the high level of
measured segmentation.
‘9 For example, in the NB~F 1988 category, 8~YP0 = -5.44, the average level of 5 in that
cluster in 1988,
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“~lhile the overwhelming result is that most of the market share of the hypothetical new
product comes from intracluster effects, examining the intercluster effects highlights the results of
the estimation. The first result is that the effect on the completely non-matching cluster (NF/NB vis
a vis F/B) is trivial (16 units). Intercluster market-stealing occurs almost exclusively among the
partially matching clusters (NF/B and F/NB). Moreover, while the effect in terms of unit quantities
is larger for the cluster which matches along the B dimension (NF/B, which loses 1350 units versus
303 units stolen from the F/NB cluster) the effect in terms of percentages is much larger for the
cluster which matches along the F dimension (F/NB, which loses over 1 percent of its unit sales,
whereas NF/B’s 1350 units represent just one tenth of one percent of total units sold).
A similar story (a large intracluster effect, and intercluster effects confined to partially
matching clusters) is told in each of the other hypothetical presented in Table 9. For example, a
hypothetical low-end clone (NF/NB) sells over 2,500 units, of which only31 are market-stealing from
the Branded group (the B/F and B~F clusters); an additional 75 are drawn from the F/NB cluster.
According to our counterfactuals and contrary to some widely held perceptions of this industry, these
clones posed little competitive threat to Branded and Frontier competitors.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
For the last 15 years, the PC industry has been one of the most innovative sectors of the economy;
at the same time, it is one of the most competitive. Such conjunction of forces seems to fly in the face
of the intuition suggested by Arrow about the necessity of monopoly power in order to induce, and
indeed pay for, costly and risky innovation. Where do rents come from in a world where
quality-adjusted prices fall at a rate of 25% per year, low-cost imitators keep driving prices ever
lower and new distribution channels eradicate the advantages of existing brand capital?
Motivated by a desire to identify the market origins of innovative rents, this paper develops
a simple discrete choice model that uses just aggregate data and can easily incorporate prior
knowledge of the structure of the indust~. We propose the Principles of Differentiation GEV,
drawing primarily from McFadden (1978) and Berry (1994). Compared to Multi-Level nested
multinominallogit models, ours is not hierarchical; therefore, it does not constrain the cross-elasticities
of substitution to conform to a specific order of nesting.
30In applying the model to the case of PCS during 1987 and 1988, we begin by noting that the
market exhibited two principles of differentiation, according to whether or not the firm could be
regarded as having a brand name, and to whether or not the product was at the technological frontier.
Much of what follows relies heavily on the above testable hypothesis: the model is structured
accordingly (there are two key substitution parameters associated with these PDs); an important
subset of the instruments used are predicated on the assumption that these PDs are a good way of
slicing the market so as to capture the different degrees of competition faced by products in them;
further computations using the estimates are designed so as to compare salient properties of the
demand functions facing products in different clusters, and to gauge inter-cluster market-stealing
effects.
The hypothesized PDs also offer a suitable framework to address the puzzles raised above:
even if the market as a whole is highly competitive, market segmentation may provide (temporary)
insulation from competition in certain clusters. Developing a brand name and/or innovating at the
frontier can generate rents by increasing buyers’ willingness to pay; depending on the strength and
the heterogeneity of this increase, B or F products can have either large demand curves or be poor
substitutes for more mundane competitors. Indeed, our findings indicate that competition in the PC
market was by no means ail all encompassing phenomenon, but that it was largely localized within
clusters. Further, having a brand name conferred a large advantage in the sense of shifting out the
demand function, whereas being early on at the technological frontier did not.
These results refer just to 1987 and 1988 and, given the rapid pace of change in the industry,
one should be wary of using them to interpret the evolution of the PC sector before and after, Yet
one inference stands out as eminently plausible: contrary to widely-held perceptions, the demise of
B3M as the paramount leader in this industry seems to have been caused not by relentless competitive
pressures from clones, but rather by the erosion of IBM’s quasi-monopoly stand within its own
cluster, first by Compaq, then by other entrepreneurial firms that invested heavily on developing a
brand name, and in some cases also positioning themselves at the frontier.
The specific, two-way grouping postulated here is just a starting point for what we believe
is an appropriate representation of the PC market at the time. Other
PC sector itself at a different time, would require different ways
industries, and perhaps even
of structuring and grouping
the
thecompeting products and firms. Indeefi, it seems that product differentiated markets very rarely, if at
all, consist just of an amorphous collection of n different products produced by m firms. Rather,
they appear to be structured according to a few principles of differentiation, which relate in turn to
a corresponding menu of strategies opened to firms. A systematic study of those principles, of the
way they differ across markets, and of their dynamics seems to be a promising and exciting line of
research in empirical Industrial Organization.
32,.
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Dataset Methodology and Sources
I. PC DATASET CONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY
We arrived at the sample of make/models used in the analysis by a process of elimination
according to the following criteria. First, we restricted ourselves to products sold by the top 25
vendors of PCs (see Table 1), and eliminated makes for which the number of units sold was less
than 300 (approximately equivalent to sales of $1,000,000). This eliminates a substantial number
of very small IBM clones, but each of these small vendors accounted for a very small fraction of
the business market at the time. In fact, over 90~o of the total number of PCs sold in 1987 and
1988 were marketed by the top 25 vendors. Secondly, we constrained the sample to PCs based
on Intel microprocessors (the IaPX 80x86 family), including “close” variation from AMD, NEC,
etc. The principal alternative microprocessor (Motorola’s 68000 family) was incorporated into
computers marketed primarily by Apple. 1 These computers were only distant substitutes to
Intel-based machines at this time.2 Finally, we eliminated makes/models for which we could not
obtain reliable data on prices andor characteristics.
II. DATA ON PRICES AND CHAR4CTERISTICS
Unfortunately there is no single data source which provides consistent and reliable
information about the price and characteristics of marketed PCs. Thus, we had to rely on a
variety of sources, and invested a great deal of effort in trying to establish consistency and
comparability. The primary data source for this purpose was the GML MicroComputer Guide, a
quarterly publication which provides list prices and technical characteristics of all PC’s marketed.
The GML data was complemented and confirmed with an extensive set of additional primary and
secondary data sources. These included 1987 and 1988 back issue catalogues and company
histories (provided directly by vendors) and a number of contemporary surveys in
ComputerWorld, Data Sources, PC World, and PC Technical Journal. Finally, a complementary
dataset with prices and characteristics of marketed PCs was graciously provided by Zvi Griliches
and Ernie Bemdt (see Bemdt and Griliches (1993)). In order to be included in the sample, a
complete and matched set of prices and characteristics needed to be identified in the GML data
or in two or more of the additional sources. For many, if not most, of the observations, we were
able to identify at least two mutually consistent sources.3
1 There were also a small number of PCs (mostly concentrated at the very low or very high
end of the quality dimension) which were based on other microprocessors (HP workstations,
Commodore PETs, etc.). We excluded them as well from the sample.
2 Graphics and marketing people tended to purchase Apple technology, whereas accounting,
manufacturing, and sales management tended to buy IBM. We experimented with including
Apple as an additional Branded firm in the context of nested logit models, but this made little
qualitative difference to the estimates. However, we have not conducted such experiments in the
context of the PD GEV model.
3 For a small number of observations, we observed sales in both years but price in only one
year. When this occurred, we imposed a price depreciation rate of 10% between the two years.APPENDIX B
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
QUANTITY
QUANj,~ Number of PC j Sold in Year t as Estimated by
COMTEC Market Analysis Services
MARKET SIZEt Total Number of Non-Proprietary Business Office
Workers; Includes Workers Who Choose Not to Purchase
MARKET SWWj,~ Market Share of Product j in Year t
QUAN / 39,000,000
CHARACTERISTICS
FRONTIERj,~ Dummy Equal to 1 if Product j Incorporates 80386
Microprocessor
BWNDEDj,~ Dummy Equal to 1 if Product j is Marketed by IBM,
AT&T, HP, or Compaq
PRICEj,, List Price of Product j in Year t as Reported in GML
MicroComputer Guide or in Two or More Additional
Sources
WMj,~ Standard Random Access Memory (RAM) Provided, in
Year t, for Product j; in Kilobytes (KB)
MHZj,~ Standard Microprocessor Speed Provided, in Year t, for
Product j; in MHZ
DISKj,~ Standard Size of Hard Disk Provided, in Year t, for
Product j; in Megabytes (MB)I
FIGURE 1











































Radio Shack 75,600 46,030
Epson 37,916 55,015


















Total (Branded or Not) 1,582,361 1,719,172
*Firms listed in order of 1987 sales within group.TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY YEAR
--l!
1987 1988
Mean Standard Mean Standard
~Pviatinn Deviation
-
—-. .—----- —-. -—-----
13,077 32,856 12,549 28,721
Market Share II .00041 .0008 I .0003 I .0007
Price $3,226 $1,692 $3,205 $1,933
Frontier 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.35
Branded 0.30 0.45 0.30 0.45
RAM 611.47 403.73 688.26 504.21
MHZ II 3.751 9.491 4.67
Disk II 11.71 I 17.29 I 15.431 22.17,’
TABLE 3
HEDONIC PRICING EQUATION
1987 & 1988 PC MARKET
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)



















I Adjusted R2 0.652TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS





























































: Unit Sales -- Sum of all the products in the cluster
P Mean Price
MHZ; RAM; Disk Mean [MHZ, RAM, Disk],. !.
Table 5
Definitions of Instruments
(Used In Model (l))*
Princit)les of Differentiation





























*Because of multicollinearity among elements of Z, we actually take an
orthonormal basis of these instrumental variables in the estimation routine.TABLE 5
PD GEV MODEL
1987 & 1988 PC MARKET
BASE(DISK) RAM MODEL MHZ MODEL VPD(MHZ)
MODEL (2) (3) MODEL
(1) (4)
1
PF 0.1346 0.1289 0.1299 0.1056
(0.1769) (0.1771) (0.1860) (0.1393)
PB 0.3367 0.3403 0.3224 0.2697
(0.0835) (0.0786) (0.0843) (0.1335)
a -0.00017 -0.00013 -0.00014 -0.00006




CONSTANT -5.0187 -5.1773 -5.1690 -5.0242
(0.5007) (0,4477) (0.5250) (0.4174)
FRONTIER -0.0269 -0,1349 0.1850 -0.3513
(0.3219) (0.2783) (0.3436) (0.2620)
BRANDED 0.5674 0.6181 0.5664 0,4872
(0,1030) (0.1326) (0,1217) (0,1141)
IBM 0.2718 0.2480 0.3024 0.2602







GMM OBJ (@): 2.173 2.356 2.445 3.238
OVERIDE~~G RESTRICTIONS TEST:
EQ1 (#OF PARAMS = 8, #of lVs = 13, ~’ (.95, 5)= 11.07, @ = 2.173)
EQ2 (# OF PARAMS = 8, #of IVs = 13, ~2 (.95, 5)= 11.07,0 = 2.356)
EQ3 (# OF PARAMS = 8, #of IVs = 13, %’(.95,5)= 11.07,@= 2.445)
EQ4 (# OF PARAMS = 9, # of IVs = 13, x’ (.95, 9) = 7.82, @ = 3.238)TABLE 7
PD GEV VERSUS TWO-LEVEL NML MODELS
1987 & 1988 PC MARKET
3H ‘i%i% ‘giF
SUBSTITUTION ~~
pF 0.1346 0.2309 0.4163
(0.1769) (0.3029) (0.2830)





CONSTANT -5.0187 -4.4696 -5.4471
(0.5007) (0.0621) (0.9444)
FRONTIER -0.0269 0.0124 -1.0365
(0.3219) (0.0522) (0.7299)
BRANDED 0.5674 1.1131 0.4038
(0.1030) (0.0077) (0.3496)
IBM 0.2718 -0.0169 0.4255
(0.1463) (0.0188) (0.2889)
DISK SIZE 0.0066 0.0021 0.0076
(0.0038) (0.0003) (0.0055)
GMM OBJ (0): -~ 0.223 2.492
----- —---- ------ -- —.—--- —----- ——-—
U VEKWEN 1lY YING WS”l’KIC1’lUNS “lES’l’:
EQ5 (#OF PARAMS = 8, # of IVs = 13, X2(.95,5)= 11.07, @ = 0.223)
EQ6 (# OF PAR4MS =8, # of IVs = 13, X2(.95,5)= 11.07, 0=2.492)TABLE 8
PD GEV MODEL
ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS OF THE INSTRUMENTS VECTOR





CONSTANT -5.4692 -5.0187 -6.27 -4.7976
(0.4061) (0.5007) (15.99) (0.4054)
FRONTIER -0.4067 -0.0269 -0.0994 -0.6361
(0.2582) (0.3219) (2.625) (0.7549)
BRANDED 0.5190 0.5674 0.6982 0.3938
(0.0911) (0.1030) (0.3348) (0.1261)
IBM 0.3627 0.2718 0.5884 0.2046
(0.1296) (0.1463) (4.4384) (0,1135)
DISK SIZE 0.0029 0,0066 -0.0069 -0.0003
(0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0308) (0.0047)
GMM OBJ (0): ~~ 0.526 0.238
VERIDENTIFYING RESTRICTIONS TEST:
EQ7 (# OF PAR4MS = 8, #of IVs = 14,X2 (.95,6)= 12.59,@= 2.349)
EQ8 (# OF PAR4MS = 8, #of ~S = 8, NO OVERIDENT RESTRICTIONS)
EQ9 (# OF PAWMS = 8, #of IVS = 8, NO OVERIDENT RESTRICTIONS)!. 1
Table 9 (A, B)
Demand Imoact of Entw of
One Additional F/B Product
AffectedCategory




































Table 9 (C, D)
Demand Imuact of EntU of
One Additional F/NB Product
Affected Category























































* Standard errors in parenthesis.